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In this paper we consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers  may have incentives to evade taxes 
and to escape sanctions, by  bribing public o fficials in charge for tax collection.  The level of monitoring  and the 
level of corruption are endogenou sly determined assuming  that the price for corruption (bribe) sets at a value  
where expected rents  in the public sector are completely dissipated in monitoring costs due to  competition 
among public o fficials. In the proposed framework, larger  fines for evasio n will increase  tax compliance with  
ambiguous eff ects on  corruption while larger  fine for corruption reduce corruption at the cost  of reducing tax  
compliance. Interestingly, a utilitarian legislator will want  to set maximal penalties. Intuitively, preventing  
corruption through  fines  is valuable to the planner since it reduces the amount of rent dissipation  in the public 
sector at the cost of decreasing deterrence for the underlying  offence (evasion). Finally the shadow value of  
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1evasion can be de¯ned as hiding the real value of a legal economic transaction
in order to avoid ¯scal liability (see Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998, for a
survey). On similar grounds, corruptive agreements are, per se, secret economic
transactions in which one agent pays a sum of money in exchange of an illicit act
by a public o±cialin order to escape sanctions for breakingpublic legislation and
regulations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In order to pay bribes economic agents,
individuals and ¯rms, have to provide for a due amount of secret funds at their
disposal to ¯nance the bribe, these funds are often provided by tax evasion. It
is quite common that enforcement authorities detecting bribing agreements also
¯nd evidence of funds that have been hidden tothe ¯scal authority. This stylized
fact alone may motivate the study of the relationships between tax evasion and
bribing agreements and its implication for the design of the enforcement policies.
At a more fundamental level, focusing on the incentives to commit o®ences,
the possibility of corruption dilutes ¯nes and other forms of punishment and,
consequently, has diluting e®ect on the deterrence of the underlying o®ence
(Becker and Stigler, 1974, Polinsky and Shavell, 2001).
As a ¯ne dilution agreement, corruption a®ects deterrence and the level of
enforcement. Exactly because tax evasion and corruption have potentially dis-
ruptive e®ects on social and economic institutions, their surging also triggers
incentives, within the legal framework, to any society and established power to
¯ght them through investment of resources in monitoring, by providing wage
incentives to enforcers and by designing suitable penalties for misbehavior. Eco-
nomic analysis has traditionally focused on the optimal mix between incentives
and probability of detection to mitigate the e®ects of these problems. The
relationships between rewards to public o±cials, ¯nes and probability of pun-
ishment, both for the underlying o®ence and for corruption, have usually been
analyzed, on normative grounds, as a choice of independent instruments by a
Government fully committed to its policy instruments.
Independence of policy instruments and commitment by the Government
to a set of policies to achieve a given level of deterrence does not necessarily
re°ect many features of how enforcement is actually delivered in the real world.
This aspects of the classical theory of enforcement is extensively discussed in
Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) who focus on the (feedback) e®ects of crime rates on
expected sanctions. As another example, in an extension of the classical the-
ory of enforcement along these directions, Andreoni (1991), in an earlier work,
provides a model of jurisdiction where the probability of penalties is inversely
related to the magnitude of the ¯nes. With rents seekers public o±cials, for
example ¯nes may a®ect the probability of apprehension. If law enforcers are
willing to accept bribes, the level of the ¯nes measures the private value of the
escaped sanction and is likely to a®ect the price and the amount of corruption.
On the other hand, larger ¯nes may also trigger larger e®ort by public o±cials
to ¯ght corruption within their administration. This may occur because public
o±cials are motivated by career concerns and they may be willing to address
e®ort to detect crimes punished by larger ¯nes. On the normative side, to the
extent that ¯nes measure the value of deterrence of evasion to the legislator,
any compensation to motivate enforcement of anticorruption legislation must
2be related to the value of the ¯nes1.
Our interest, is therefore, to study an economy where legislated ¯nes for
¯scal non compliance and for corruption in°uence the incentives to commit
the underlying o®ence and the price for corruption, but also a®ects the level
of monitoring activities and the probability of punishment through the reward
to honest public o±cials. To address these issues, we study the relationship
between tax evasion, corruption and monitoring activities as simultaneously
determined in a simple exchange economy where a public good is provided in
a legal framework set to mitigate the free riding problem associated to ¯scal
non compliance. Our legal framework is de¯ned by a legislation setting ¯nes
and tax rates and by a simple tax administration in charge for rising public
funds. Members of the tax administration are assumed to be rent seekers:
tax auditors seek to appropriate rents by possibly accepting bribes and public
o±cials, in charge for monitoring corruption, deliver monitoring e®ort in order
to gain rewards positively related to ¯nes.
To focus on the relationships between evasion, corruption and enforcement
in the simplest possible setting we build up a model that can be described as
follows. We extend the standard tax evasion problem faced by a population
of identical taxpayers, who can be audited by self interested public o±cials,
by introducing the possibility that the payment of a bribe arises in return for
tax evasion not being reported, once discovered. If evasion is discovered, the
possibility of a bribing agreement arises and may lead to corruption. The bribe
is de¯ned as a transfer from the non compliant taxpayer to the public o±cial
splitting the joint surplus of the coalition, taking as given the level of monitoring
in the economy. The incentives to enter the illegal agreement, i.e. the frequency
with which bribing coalitions emerge from tax audits, are a®ected by the level of
internal monitoring in the ¯scal administration. The probability of corruption
detection is endogeneized by introducing a simple two layer structure in the
organization in charge for the enforcement of ¯scal legislation. The incentives
to monitor corruption are related to the amount of ¯nes that can be collected
as a result of the activity. In other words monitoring activities and bribing
coalitions both emerge as a way for the publico±cials in the ¯scal administration
to appropriate rents above their salary. Competition in rent seeking by public
o±cials completely dissipates rents: both corruption and its monitoring, along
with bribes, are set at the level where expected costs equate expected bene¯ts
from corruption and monitoring.
This speci¯cation, in which, for the seek of simplicity we do not consider
distortionary e®ects of taxation on the amount of private good produced in the
economy, will allow us to study (among other things) the e®ects of raising ¯nes
on both the underlying o®ence (evasion) and corruption. The main results can
be synthesized as follows: an increase of the ¯ne for evasion reduces tax evasion
whereas its e®ects on the size of corruption are ambiguous. As for the ¯ne for
1Of course, Becker and Stigler (1974), in their study of the optimal compensation to en-
forcers, recognize the mutualdependence ofthe priceofcorruption (bribe)fromthe probability
of corruption detection and other variables. However, in the analysis, they assume both as
exogenously given.
3corruption, its increase lead to a reduction in corruption and monitoring at the
cost of increasing tax evasion.
The ¯nal issue analyzed in the paper is normative. In our setting, for both
evasion and corruption, the incentives to perform monitoring activities are in-
creasing in the level of ¯nes and are not independent deterrence instruments in
the hand of the legislator as usually assumed in the extension to the classical
theory of enforcement. Taking into account the implications of the assumption
of complete dissipation of rents (bribes and collected ¯nes) into monitoring costs,
we consider a utilitarian government who cannot commit the level of corruption
monitoring and we ask whether a maximal ¯ne principle holds even when the
probability of corruption cannot be set independently of the ¯nes and we study
the implications of imperfect enforcement on the provision of public good.
The issues raised in the paper are related to several strands of the literature
on tax evasion and corruption and more generally on the optimal deterrence pol-
icy against corruption and the underlying o®ence. In a normative perspective,
the problem of the relationship between corruption, enforcement and deterrence
of the underlying o®ence has been recently analyzed, among others, by Polinsky
and Shavell (2001), who examine both the optimal amount of resources to be
allocated to law enforcement and detection of bribery and the optimal schedule
of ¯nes. Since bribery agreements can dilute deterrence of the underlying vio-
lation, it is desirable for society to attempt to detect and penalize corruption in
order to preserve a given degree of deterrence for the underlying o®ence. This
result holds even if corruption itself is not completely deterred. Moreover, Polin-
sky and Shavell also show that both the optimal ¯ne for the underlying o®ense
and the optimal ¯ne for bribery should be maximal, mainly because detecting
any violation involves a cost. These results extend the classical theory of en-
forcement to the case when corruption may dilute deterrence for the underlying
o®ence. A distinctive feature of their approach to the analysis of corruption,
as in the classical analysis of the deterrence problem, is the assumption that
the Government can fully commit to a monitoring probability independently of
the level of the ¯nes, which leads to perfect substitutability between ¯nes and
probability of detection for a given level of deterrence.
However, to motivate our normative analysis, committing to a given proba-
bility of monitoring is not necessarily a feasible policy to a planner. In principle,
ex-post incentives to inspect illegal activities are not independent of the size of
the ¯nes. For a given crime level it is possible to argue that the incentives
to provide monitoring activities are positively related to the magnitude of the
¯nes. For example, a tax authority may have incentives to strengthen its in-
spection activity when ¯nes for evasion are increased, since this could raise its
revenues. As another example, think of prosecutors' incentives to investigate
corruption to be high when the ¯nes for corruption are high since this provides
better career perspectives. In our model the mutual relationship between ¯nes
and probability of detection is based on the idea that larger ¯nes trigger larger
monitoring by enforcing authorities.
Other contributions (see, for instance, Chander and Wilde, 1992 and Moohk-
erjee and Png, 1995,) also consider the e®ect of corruption on deterrence of the
4underlying o®ence taking the probability of corruption being detected as ex-
ogenous. In this case it is of course true that raising ¯nes does not a®ect the
probability of corruption monitoring and expected sanctions.
In the speci¯c case of tax evasion, Chander and Wilde (1992), integrate the
analysis of corruption and tax evasion studying the e®ects of corruption on opti-
mal auditing strategies by the tax administration. Extending previous work on
game theoretic models of tax compliance, they show that the possibility of cor-
ruption modi¯es the strategic design of auditing probabilities by a rational tax
administration: large auditing costs may induce a revenue maximizing agency to
dismantle auditing altogether in the presence of corruption, whereas, for small
auditing costs, the presence of corruption may induce the agency to audit eva-
sion more aggressively than in the absence of corruption since, in the context
of their model, this raises revenues from honest evaders (not interested in cor-
rupting public o±cials) as a reply to increase in auditing. In their model, the
probability of monitoring corruption is exogenously given. It is di±cult to say
whether the feature of their equilibrium (and comparative statics results) con-
tinue to hold in the case when corruption is allowed to depend on the auditing
probability.
Besley and Mc Laren (1993) study the e®ect of corruption on tax compli-
ance in a model where the amount of corruption and the level of monitoring is
endogenous. Their model is focused on the analysis of di®erent wage incentive
regimes (e±ciency wages, reservation wage and capitulation wages) on expected
tax revenues in economies with etherogenous agents (honest and dishonest). In
discussing their results the authors argue that a revenue maximizing govern-
ment faces two broadly de¯ned equilibrium regimes, one in which the degree of
honesty in the economy is large and public o±cials are paid their reservation
wage and one in which honesty is low and there is room for wage incentives.
In this latter case, high (low) costs of monitoring require that corruption is ef-
fectively deterred through granting rents (paying reservation wage) to auditing
public o±cials. Their analysis, mainly focused on the relationship between tax
evasion and corruption in underdeveloped economies, builds on the assumption
that public agencies are not able to enforce ¯nes to deter dishonesty neither
in tax compliance nor in the bribing agreement. Of course, as a consequence,
e±ciency wages to public enforcers are not related to ¯nes in their model.
Mookherjee and Png (1995) also study the problem of optimal compensa-
tion policy for a corruptible inspector in charge for monitoring the underlying
o®ence (pollution) and its e®ects on the endogenous probability of detection of
the underlying o®ence given an exogenous probability that the corruptive agree-
ment is detected. In this paper they propose an interesting view of the bribe:
along with its traditional ¯ne dilution e®ect i.e. as a part of the implicit price
faced by the ¯rm for committing the underlying o®ence, they also emphasize its
role as a form of remuneration for motivating e®ort by public o±cials in their
auditing activities. They show that increasing compensation to public o±cials
and raising the penalty for corruption will reduce their incentive to exert mon-
itoring e®ort whereas bribes do encourage e®ort. However, in the presence of
underdeterrence for the underlying o®ence they also show that bribe is an ine±-
5cient way to motivate e®ort by public o±cials. Even in this case the probability
of discovery the bribing agreement between the public o±cial and the ¯rm is
exogenous and does not depend on the level of the ¯nes for corruption.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce
the setting for the simple economy to be analyzed, in section 3 we model tax
evasion under the possibility of corrupting the tax auditor, in section 4 we
introduce the inspection game between the two layers of the public hierarchy,
in section 5 the general equilibrium of the simple economy is characterized, in
section 6 we provide our normative results, section 7 concludes.
2 A simple economy
We consider a simple economy composed of N identical agents,with N normal-
ized to 1. The preferences of each agent are described by the utility function
U = Ey + u(G), where Ey is the expected income and G the amount of pub-
lic good, with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. In order to get resources for the provision
of the public good G, tax revenues have to be collected. Given that the tax
base is veri¯able only at a positive cost, self interested agents have incentives
to under report the tax base unless a large enough punishment for misbehavior
is credibly anticipated. In order to deter evasion society assigns to a public
enforcement agency, composed by a subset of the total population n1, the right
to audit taxpayers and, in case evidence for evasion is found, the right to report
misbehavior to the Tax Authority. The right to collect evidence for misbehavior
and apply ¯nes does not prevent agents in the enforcement structure (tax au-
ditors or public o±cials) to concede on the temptation to collect private gains
from their activity in the form of bribes, denoted by b. This opportunity dilutes
deterrence of tax evasion and, in order to keep incentives for the taxpayers to re-
port their income large enough, we consider the possibility that resources can be
devoted to controlling bribery agreements by another fraction of (incorruptible)
monitorers, n2.
This basic institutional framework is consistent with the idea that the en-
forcement structure is organized through a legal system: the legislature sets
¯nes for misbehavior, o®ences have to be proved at a cost and responsibility
for enforcement falls on an agency whose actual behavior cannot be precom-
mitted at the legislative stage. This simple society has to decide the amount
of public good to be provided given the constraints set by imperfect enforce-
ment. Moreover, an institutional setting specifying controls and remuneration
of public o±cials has to be arranged.
To analyze the basic features of this problem we set up a speci¯c model
whose timeline structure is as follows:
Stage 1. Income tax rate ¿, ¯nes for evasion ©e; and ¯nes for corruption
©Â are set, the number of public o±cials n1 having the right to monitor ¯scal
reports is hired, an agency, composed of n2 individuals in charge of controlling
public o±cials, is established.
Stage 2. Given the institutional setting above, n0 risk neutral taxpayers
6decide the fraction ® of the tax base M to be reported.
Stage 3. n1 tax audits are delivered. With probability p the exact amount
of tax evasion is discovered and veri¯ed by each tax auditor.
Stage 4. Among the subset of veri¯ed tax evasion acts, pn1, the possibility
of a bribe b arises. The surplus to the parties in the secret coalition is de¯ned
by the ¯ne for evasion and the ¯ne for corruption to be paid in the event the
bribery agreement is discovered. This surplus is divided according to the Nash
bargaining solution. Simultaneously the monitoring agency sets the level of
internal monitoring to be delivered, taking into account its bene¯ts (¯nes col-
lected) and its costs. Monitoring occurs, a fraction of the bribery agreements
are discovered, punishment is implemented, the public good is produced and
consumed.
The distinguishing features of the model outlined above are that the rates of
corruption and monitoring are endogenously determined, given the level of tax
evasion, to capture the idea that, in expected terms, corruption and its price
(the level of the bribe) are set at a level such that in equilibrium there are no
expected rents from working in the public sector either as a tax auditor nor as
a an o±cial in charge for monitoring their work.
The aim will be the characterization of the decision of atomistic taxpayers,
given the enforcement structure outlined above, and the corresponding level of
monitoring and corruption emerging in the equilibrium of the game. Finally, at
the normative stage optimal ¯nes and tax rates will be de¯ned given that no
commitment to enforcement levels is assumed in the analysis.
3 Tax evasion with bribery
The seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provides the standard
framework for the economic analysis of tax evasion. Given the enforcement
structure and the tax system of an economy and assuming that the true tax base
of any taxpayer is costly observable by the Tax Authority, rational taxpayers are
faced with the decision of whether to reduce tax payments by under-reporting
their income level. The private cost of exploiting this opportunity is related
to both the probability that under-reporting will be detected and, in case of
detection, to a monetary penalty. Thus, the decision of whether, and how
much, to evade resembles the choice of whether, and how much, to gamble; it
follows that under certain circumstances the taxpayer may decide to report a
taxable income below its true value. This basic version of the model has been
extended along a number of directions. Among these the most relevant for the
purpose of this paper is the one which suggests that the tax evasion decision
may be in°uenced by the probability of corruption of public o±cials. In our
case, we consider the behavior of risk neutral individuals facing the probability
that evasion is documented, once an audit takes place, positively related to
the amount of evasion. This feature of the veri¯cation technology characterizes
most tax systems and has been already introduced in the literature (Slemrod and
Yitzhaki, 2000). For example, Yitzhaki (1987) assumes that the probability of
7proving the illicit act is an increasing function of evaded income2. Therefore the
increase in expected income due to an increase in evasion, for a given probability
of veri¯cation p(®), is o®set by the increase in the probability of veri¯cation
p0(®), this latter limiting the extent of evasion and yielding an interior solution
for ®, the fraction of tax base reported.
As for the institutional arrangement we assume that the amount of moni-
toring to be performed in society is positively related to the expected ¯nes that
can be collected. For any given level of compensation w to be paid to the en-
forcers (tax auditors and their monitorers), corruption will be monitored to the
extent that the expected ¯nes collected cover the cost of monitoring, z. For any
given level of expected monitoring, m, the public o±cial who managed to prove
evasion has to decide whether or not entering a bribing agreement and, in the
a±rmative, the surplus from the agreement is split according to the Nash bar-
gaining solution. Notice that the level of bribes, corruption and monitoring is
set simultaneously, for any given level of tax auditing. Simultaneity is a natural
implication of the following assumptions: a. the bribing coalition is atomistic
with respect to the economy and takes the probability of monitoring as given at
the aggregate level, b. the bribing coalition is secret by de¯nition and, hence,
the decision to monitor tax auditors is taken without observing the (aggregate)
level of bribes.
It is worth to stress that in our setting we assumed that the compensation
to enforcers, w, is exogenous for the ¯scal authority and that committing mon-
itoring is not feasible. These assumptions are motivated by our aim to study
the problem of the enforcement of tax legislation and associated bribing trans-
actions such that expected rents (bribes and ¯nes) are dissipated in the process
of enforcement.
The model can be summarized as follows: the economy is composed of three
types of agents, a monitoring agency (composed of n2 monitorers), a population
of public o±cials (tax auditors, n1), and a population of taxpayers (1¡n1¡n2).
Taxpayers are measure zero with respect to the size of the economy and choose
the fraction of their taxable income, ®, to be reported to the tax authority.
In doing so, they take into account that, according to the auditing technology,
they will be monitored with a given probability a =
n1
1¡n1¡n2, and evasion will
be discovered with probability p(®) which is decreasing in the share of reported
income. If a taxpayer evades and the evasion is discovered, she will be subject
to a monetary ¯ne, ©e. At the same time the taxpayer expects that, with a
given probability, Â, a bribing agreement will be settled. In the latter case,
the taxpayer would pay a bribe, b, to the tax collector instead of the ¯ne ©e.
By exploiting the opportunity of a bribery agreement, however, the taxpayer is
aware that if the illegal transaction will be detected by the monitoring agency,
which can happen with a probability m, she will incur into an additional penalty
2"The assumption that the probability of being caught is independent of the amount of
income evaded seems very unrealistic. Usually, the tax authorities have some idea of the
taxpayer's true income, and it seemsreasonable to assume thatthe probablity of being caught
is an increasingfunction ofthe undeclared income (oroftheratioofundeclared totrue income,
as in Srinivasan, 1973)." S. Yitzhaki, 1987, p.127.
8©Â, over and above the penalty for evasion.
3.1 The bribery agreement
Let M be the level of income earned by a taxpayer and 0 · ¿ · 1 be the
income tax rate in the economy. If the taxpayer reported a fraction ® of her
income, with 0 · ® · 1, the net disposable income will be (1¡ ¿®)M. Assume
that taxpayers' reports are subject to an audit with probability a and evasion
is discovered with probability p. If evasion is reported, the taxpayer will have
to pay a ¯ne ©e, which we assume to be proportional to the tax evasion, that
is ©e = Áe[¿ (1¡ ®) M] where the parameter Áe, measures the ¯ne rate for
evasion3 We assume, with no signi¯cant restrictions, Áe > 1. In this state of the
world the taxpayer may be willing to pay a bribe, b, to the auditor in return for
her evasion not being reported. In order to de¯ne the surplus to be split in the
bribing coalition, we examine under which conditions both the tax auditor and
the taxpayer are willing to enter the bribery agreement.
If the evader pays b, she faces a probability m that the auditor will be moni-
tored and the bribe detected. In this case the bribe transaction will be undone4
and the taxpayer will have to pay both the ¯ne for evasion, ©e, and a ¯ne for
bribery ©Â which we assume to be proportional to the bribe, ©Â = ÁÂb, (ÁÂ >





b(1¡ m)5. It follows that once audited and detected as an evader, the taxpayer
will be willing to pay a bribe rather than comply to the ¯ne for evasion if and
only if
£
ÁÂb + Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M
¤




1 ¡ m + ÁÂm
Áe[¿(M ¡ ®M)]:
Consider now the incentives to take a bribe faced by an auditor. We assume
that if she takes a bribe and the bribery agreement will be detected, the bribing
agreement is undone and she will have to pay a ¯ne. For simplicity, this ¯ne is
set at the same level as for the taxpayer. Hence, the auditor will accept a bribe
if and only if
b(1 ¡ m) ¸ ÁÂbm
or, equivalently,
3In this case, the tax payer's disposable income will be M ¡¿®M ¡Áe[¿ (M ¡®M)].
4The assumption that the bribe transaction is undone once discovered is common the
literature. See, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (2001).
5It follows that the disposable income of the evader would be either M ¡¿®M ¡ b, if the
public o±cial will not be monitored, or M ¡¿®M ¡Áe¿(1¡®)M ¡ÁÂb, if the public o±cial
will be monitored.




Thus, a bribery agreement can be implemented for any bribe b such that
0 < b ·
(1 ¡ m)
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ÁÂ)m
[Áe¿(1¡ ®)Mi]: (2)
We assume that when the conditions above are satis¯ed, the bribery agree-
ment is implemented and the outcome b¤ will be determined as the solution of
a Nash bargaining problem. In particular, by denoting with ´ the bargaining
power of the evader and with 1 ¡ ´ the bargaining power of the public o±cial,
it follows that 6
b¤ = (1¡ ´)
(1¡ m)
1 ¡ m + ÁÂm
[Áe¿(1¡ ®)M] (3)
Notice that the bribe is increasing in the ¯ne for evasion, at a rate less than
one, as well as, of course, in the bargaining power of the public o±cial. At the
same time, the bribe is decreasing in the monitoring probability, a feature that
will be crucial to characterize the equilibrium solution of the model.
3.2 The tax evasion decision
We turn now to the taxpayer's income reporting decision. If not audited, the
taxpayer will enjoy a net disposable income given evasion M ¡ ¿®M. If audited
his evasion will be discovered and veri¯ed with probability p. In the event of
veri¯cation the taxpayer can either pay the due ¯nes for evasion ©e or entering
a bribing agreement paying a bribe b at the expected cost that the agreement
will be discovered and ¯nes for evasion and ¯nes for corruption will be charged.
Given the relevant states of the world weighted by the appropriate probabilities,
the expected income tothe taxpayer will be given by his disposable income, gross
of evasion, less expected ¯nes:
Ey = (1 ¡ ¿®)M ¡ apf(1¡ Â)©e + Â(1 ¡ m)b+ Âm(©e + ©Â)g
where a is the probability that a tax auditing will occur, p is the probability
that, given auditing, tax evasion is veri¯ed, Â is the probability that a bribing
agreement will occur and m the probability that the agreement will be discov-
ered.
In making the evasion decision, the taxpayer, being an atom, takes the equi-
librium probability of corruption and monitoring as given and anticipates the
6In the worst state of the world, that is after having paid both the ¯ne forevasion and the
¯ne for bribery, the taxpayer'sdisposable income will be M¡¿®M¡Áe¿(1¡®)M ¡ÁÂb¤. By
recognizing the inability ofindividualsto pay extreme ¯nesand thatin general individuals are
rarely ¯ned an amount approximating their wealth, it seems appropriate to assume at least
M ¡¿®M ¡Áe¿(1¡ ®)M ¡ÁÂb¤ ¸ 0. The latter implies a constraint on the ¯nes structure
designed by the tax authority to be credible.
10e®ect of evasion on the ¯nes and the bribe he has to pay, provided the relevant
states occur. By substituting the anticipated equilibrium level of the bribe b¤
and the expected ¯nes in her expected income, this can be written as follows
Ey = (1 ¡ ¿®)Mi ¡ ap[(1 ¡ ´Â(1¡ m)]Áe(1 ¡ ®)¿Mi
Under the hypothesis of risk neutrality evasion takes place if and only if Ey
is greater than the disposable income from full tax compliance
Ey > (1 ¡ ¿)Mi
that is, if and only if
Áeap[1¡ ´Â(1 ¡ m)] < 1 (4)
The higher is the probability p of verifying tax evasion and/or the lower the
joint probability Â(1¡m) of a bribery agreement not being monitored, the lower
would be the ¯ne necessary to discourage underreporting of taxable income. The
assumption of a linear ¯ne for bribery implies that the ¯ne rate ÁÂ does not
have any role in exploiting the opportunity of evasion by risk neutral agents.
Moreover, for any p, the expected income of the taxpayer in case of evasion
is decreasing in ® provided that (4) holds, which implies the usual prediction
that a risk-neutral taxpayer either reports the true taxable income (® = 1), or
reports no income at all (® = 0), depending on whether evasion has a positive
expected payo®.
To characterize the optimal amount of evasion we now follow Yitzhaki (1987)
and introduce the assumption that the joint probability of an audit taking place
and the proof of evasion obtained is given by q(®) = ap(®). We make the
following assumptions: 1. p® < 0 i.e. the probability of evasion veri¯cation
is decreasing in the reported tax base , 2. p®;® ¸ 0, that is the probability
is decreasing at decreasing rate (decreasing returns in the state veri¯cation
technology). Moreover, to warrant an interior equilibrium report, we also make
the following assumptions: 3. p(1) = 0, no extortion for any audited taxpayer
who truthfully reports7, 4. the absolute value of p®(0) large enough, i.e. we
assume that at large level of evasion increasing the report on the tax base reduces
expected ¯nes su±ciently fast. The problem for a risk neutral taxpayer is to
determine ® in order to maximize the expected income, given the deterrence
policy and the opportunity of paying a bribe to the auditor in the occurrence




Since the taxpayer is measure zero with respect to the economy, she takes
as null the e®ect of its contribution to the aggregate level of the public good.
7It easy to verify that this assumption is not strictly necessary to warrant an interior
equilibrium for ®. For p(1) > 0 our framework would be consistent with the possibility that
some extortion occurs. Polinsky and Shavell (2001) present a detailed analysis of extortion in
the framework provided by the classical theory of enforcement. Hindricks, Keen and Muthoo
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Tax Evasion
Therefore, the ¯rst order condition of the expected utility maximization problem
implies a maximizing value b ®(Â;m;´;Áe;a) such that
¡1+ aÁe [1 ¡ ´Â(1¡ m)][p(b ®) ¡ (1¡ b ®)pb ®] = 0 (5)
At an interior equilibrium the taxpayer just balances expected marginal cost
of an additional unit of tax with the expected marginal bene¯t of a reduction
in expected ¯nes. Further, the second order condition for a maximum requires
that
2p® ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p®;® < 0
which is satis¯ed by the assumptions on p(®).
Lemma 1 Given the assumptions on p(®), for any set of Â;m;´;Áe; and a > 0,
0 < ´ < 1, there exists 0 < b ® < 1 satisfying 4.
Proof: The graphical representation for the taxpayer equilibrium condition
is reported in ¯gure 1 for generic values of p(0);p®(0) and p(1). ¡(®) represents
the second term in (5). It easy to see that the second order condition, p(1) = 0
and p®(0) large enough are su±cient conditions for an interior equilibrium.
The intuition is straightforward. For ® low enough the assumptions on p(®)
guarantee large enough incentives to reduce evasion, the opposite being true for
® close enough to 1. Also notice that given the hypothesis of risk neutrality and
the assumption that the ¯ne for corruption is the same for both parties of the
bribing agreement, the equilibrium evasion, along with the equilibrium bribe,
does not depend on the ¯ne for corruption. More generally, it is immediate to
12conclude that @b ®=@Áe > 0, @b ®=@Â < 0, and @b ®=@m > 0, which will turn out
to be crucial results in the characterization of the equilibrium of the model. A
larger ¯ne for evasion increases the direct cost of evasion and the indirect cost
of corruption both leading to an increase in b ®; a larger probability of corruption
decreases the expected cost of corruption leading to a decrease in b ®, corruption
diluted tax enforcement; ¯nally, b ® increasing in m since a larger probability
of monitoring bribing coalitions increases the expected cost of corruption. As
already noticed the level of ¯scal non compliance does not directly depend on
the ¯ne for corruption: the expected cost of evasion by risk neutral taxpayers,
under proportional ¯nes for corruption, is simply determined by the level of the
¯nes for evasion.
4 Endogenous corruption and monitoring
In the previous section we derived the optimal level of tax evasion and the level
of bribes when the taxpayer takes the level of ¯nes, the aggregate probability of
tax auditing, the aggregate level of corruption and the probability of detection
for a corruptive agreement as given. As expected, in our model, in a similar
way as, for example, in Polinsky and Shavell (2001), the possibility of corruption
dilutes deterrence of tax evasion.
In this section we study, in the simplest possible setting, the case of endoge-
nous level of anti corruption activities. To this aim we determine the probability
of monitoring and the level of corruption by modelling the relationship between
auditors and the monitorers as a simple inspection game occurring in a two
layers hierarchical organization. Di®erently from Mookherjee and Png (1992)
and Besley and McLaren (1993) we keep the level of wages to public o±cials in
charge for the enforcement of the (anti evasion and anti corruption) legislation
at the reservation wage8 and concentrate on the incentives to behave provided
to tax auditors by the ¯nes and the probability of monitoring. For given lev-
els of ¯nes for corruption and ¯nes for evasion we determine the fraction Â of
tax auditors holding evidence of evasion that decide to become corrupt and the
probability m that the corruptive agreement will be monitored and discovered.
In the event that an auditor manages to prove an act of evasion, which occurs
with probability ap(®), the opportunity of forming a bribing coalition emerges
with probability Â. The secret coalition is monitored with probability m. Both
probabilities along with equilibrium bribe, are determined in such a way that
the public o±cial holding evidence of evasion is indi®erent between taking the
bribe (not reporting the act of evasion) or not. The monitoring level is such that
the monitoring authority is indi®erent between inspecting or not. This amounts
to assuming perfect competition in both rent seeking activities, corruption and
monitoring: in both activities expected bene¯ts equate expected costs and in
both cases corruption and its monitoring are such that no rents in the aggregate
8See Becker and Stigler (1974) for the design of the appropriate life time pay structure
such that public enforcers do not receive a lifetime payment that exceed what they could in
alternative occupations.
13are left.
Consider the case of a Tax Authority inspecting at a level such that if cor-
ruption is detected she will collect a pecuniary ¯ne for evasion ©e from the tax
evader9. As for the tax auditor, her revenues are w, whether she honestly re-
ports evasion or not. However if discovered she pays a ¯ne for corruption ©Â.
We do not formally consider dismissal from the tax agency. However, in our
simple economy an outside option could be the endogenous expected income
to the taxpayer, therefore we set w = Ey. Of course this is not the harshest
punishment a tax auditor may incur once caught in a corruptive agreement.
By applying to the tax auditor a di®erent ¯nes for corruption compared to the
taxpayer, the Government could drive the corrupt public o±cial to the same
income level as the taxpayer in the worst possible state of the world, i.e. once
both the ¯ne for evasion and the ¯ne for corruption have been applied. However
this possibility would not change the basic analysis which is the focus of our
paper: studying the e®ects of the magnitude of the ¯nes on the incentives to
monitor, it would just change the equilibrium level of monitoring but not its
equilibrium relationship with the level of corruption.
Public o±cials in the upper layer of the hierarchy also get the reservation
wage in the economy w, plus expected bene¯ts from monitoring activity mea-
sured by ¯nes. Monitoring entails a cost z. Table 1 reports the payo® matrix
for the game.
Table 1 - The inspection game for a given b > 0
Tax Authority
Monitor (m) Not monitor (1 ¡ m)
Tax Corrupt (Â) w ¡ ÁÂb;w + p©e ¡ z w + b;w
Auditor
Not corrupt (1 ¡ Â) w;w ¡ z w;w
Perfect competition in rent seeking is equivalent to no rents and, therefore,
to the Nash equilibrium in the inspection game between a public o±cial in the
Tax authority and the Tax Auditor. Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies de-
¯nes an equilibrium probability of monitoring such that rents from corruption
are completely dissipated (expected bene¯ts from corruption are equal to ex-
pected costs) and an equilibrium probability of corruption such that rents from
monitoring are driven to zero. We solve, therefore, for the Nash equilibrium
of the inspection game. The expected payo® to the tax authority in case of
monitoring corruption will be equal to Â(w + ©ep¡ z) + (1¡ Â)(w ¡ z), where
Â is the probability of the public o±cial not reporting a detected evasion. The
equilibrium level of corruption Â is set at the level where the expected cost are
equal to the expected bene¯t from the monitoring activity, i.e.
Â©ep = z:
9Remember that, once discovered, the bribe agreement is undone. Remember also that,
to simplify the analysis, we are assuming that the same ¯ne rate to be applied both to the
public o±cial and to the taxpayer.
14which delivers an interior solution for the aggregate frequency of corruption if
z < ©ep.
Looking at the decision of the tax auditor holding evidence of corruption, the
equilibrium level of monitoring m is such that her expected pro¯t from taking
the bribe are equal to the expected cost, i.e.
¡ÁÂbm + b(1¡ m) = 0:










Notice that, for any given level of ® and b, the equilibrium level of monitoring
and corruption depend on the ¯nes: the larger the ¯ne for corruption the lower
the equilibrium monitoring level. The reason is that a larger ¯ne will reduce the
bene¯t from corruption, triggering a lower level of anticorruption e®ort within
the hierarchy. On the other hand, the level of corruption is inversely related to
the level of the ¯nes for evasion: larger ¯nes for evasion will motivate monitoring
e®ort and the equilibrium level of corruption has to decrease in reply.
Of course the simple expressions derived above result from the assumptions
we have made about risk neutrality and proportional ¯nes. For example a dif-
ferent punishment structure for corruption (including dismissal), a more general
incentive contract involving rents to be distributed in case of honest behavior,
a more sophisticated monitoring strategy or a more general ¯ne structure in-
volving a ¯xed cost for corruption and evasion once detected, would change the
expression above. However not much would be added to the analysis of the
e®ect on deterrence of the mutual dependence of monitoring and corruption
when the ¯ne structure motivates monitoring e®ort10. Moreover, as simple as
it is, our model is devised to analyze an economy where bribes and rewards for
¯ghting corruption do not generate systematic rents in the economy. On the
one hand, rent seeking by tax auditors through bribes has a negative externality
on the economy, diluting expected ¯nes and exacerbating the free riding prob-
lem in the context of tax evasion. On the other hand, rent (reward) seeking
by the upper layer of the hierarchy through monitoring limits the disruptive
e®ect of corruption and allows tax revenues to be collected. Competition for
rents (bribes) and rewards (expected ¯nes) drives expected pro¯ts to zero. From
the economic point of view our model is a simple competitive model where the
negative externalities of corruptive agreements on the credibility of the whole
enforcement structure is limited by competition in monitoring activities.
10To the extent that in a given legal framework the level of the ¯nes measures the private
value of corruption to the bribe giver and the shadow value of the underlying o®ence and
corruption to society, any incentive contract to the public o±cial, involving monitoring or
not, should depend on the level of the ¯nes.
15Finally notice that the simple inspection game described above can easily
be extended to alternative assumptions about the information structure of the
agents, including etherogeneity in the cost of being detected as a corrupt agent
and under di®erent speci¯cation for the rewards to the monitoring agent.11
In each of these cases the general link between ¯nes (both on the underlying
o®ence and on corruption) and monitoring is preserved. More generally our
simple structure for the rewards to the monitoring activities resembles what
Posner (1998) de¯nes as private enforcement. Our claim is that once we in-
troduce elements of private enforcement to motivate public o±cial the classical
dycothomy between ¯nes and the probability of detection is lost since changing
¯nes has impact on the incentives to perform monitoring.
To summarize: at any given level of the bribe and at any given level of the
underlying o®ence corruption cannot pay in our economy, but also crime control
cannot be a source for systematic rents. In our simple formulation both the lower
and the upper level of the tax enforcement hierarchy compete for bribes and ¯ne
collection respectively, up to the point where rents are completely dissipated.
Having de¯ned the equilibrium relationship between the level of monitoring
and the level of corruption we have to de¯ne the equilibrium level of the price for
corruption and the equilibrium level of evasion. The following section contains
a characterization of the (general) equilibrium level for the underlying o®ence
(tax evasion), corruption and monitoring.
5 Equilibrium Tax evasion, Corruption and mon-
itoring
Given a set (Áe, ÁÂ, ´, ¿, z, M), the auditing technology described by a and
p(®) we solve for the equilibrium of the economy. Each taxpayer decides the
level of evasion, taking m and Â as given, (determining b ®); each public o±cial
holding evidence of evasion decides whether to enter into a bribery agreement
or not, given m and b; at the same time, the Tax Authority decides the level
of monitoring, after having observed the monitoring cost z and given Â and b.
The level of b is determined as the Nash bargaining solution of the bilateral
monopoly problem of the bribing coalition. It is important to note that the
taxpayer conceives her reporting strategy by taking into account the e®ect on
p(®), the probability of a tax audit and on b, the amount of the bribe given
auditing. However, being measure zero, she does not take into account any
11The model was solved also for alternative assumptions on the information structure and
in the case of di®erent alternative reward functions for the monitoring activity. For example,
we considered the case in which the bene¯ts to the agent in charge for monitoring corruption
were related to the ¯ne for corruption rather than the ¯ne for evasion, in the case in which
these rewards are related to the total amount of ¯nes applied as a result of the monitoring
activity and in the case in which monitoring costs z are private information. In all the cases
the equilibrium level of monitoring in the economy is the same as above, whereas the equilib-
rium level of corruption, although always de¯ned by the equivalence of expected bene¯ts and
expected costs from monitoring yields similar equilibrium conditions as for the case provided
in the text.
16e®ect of her choice on the strategies to be chosen in the continuation game,
Â and m. p(®) is the probability of state (tax base) veri¯cation, under the
assumption that the larger the size of the evasion the easier is to prove it.
Technically, this amounts to solve for the optimal reporting strategy simul-
taneously with the monitoring game between the monitoring agency and the
public o±cials. The assumption of taxpayers being measure zero also has the
implication that, in determining the bribe b, no e®ect on the value of m is an-
ticipated and taken into account. Therefore, Nash bargaining can be solved
independently of the monitoring game. We characterize the equilibrium for the
economy where taxpayers optimize over the level of ¯scal compliance and the
level of corruption and monitoring fully dissipate expected rents from bribing
and monitoring.
An interior equilibrium with bribe is a triple (®¤, m¤, Â¤) obtained as the
solution of the system made of (5), (6), and (7), given (3) with all the elements
in the triple being strictly between zero and one.
After substituting for m¤ from (6) into (5) and (7), the equilibrium level of








[p(®) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p®] = 1 (8)
and
p(®)Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)MÂ = z (9)
provided that Â¤ · 1, i.e. p(®)Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M > z.
We refer to (9) as the zero pro¯t condition in monitoring activities de¯ning
couples of Â and ® such that no rents are expected from monitoring activities
and to (8) as the taxpayer's equilibrium condition de¯ning couples of Â and ®
such that the taxpayer is optimizing over the level of ¯scal compliance.
Since p® < 0 and p®;® ¸ 0, the taxpayer's equilibrium condition, ®(Â), is
continuous and monotonically decreasing in Â. The intuition is straightforward:
since corruption dilutes ¯nes, a larger degree of Â calls for an increasing level of
evasion. The zero pro¯t condition in monitoring activities, Â(®), is continuous
and monotonically increasing in ®, with Â(0) = z=[Áe¿Mp(0)]. Even in this case
the intuition is quite simple: given a level of monitoring, Â(®) is monotonically
increasing in ® and the slope measures the increase in aggregate corruption level
which necessary to compensate the increase in tax compliance in order to keep
monitoring at a given level.
Thus, we conclude that for any set of parameters satisfying assumptions in
Lemma 1, the equilibrium exists and it involves both some evasion, ® < 1, and
corruption Â with bribery, b > 0.
The results can be summarized as follows
Proposition 2 In the economy with no expected rents from corruption and
monitoring and with a veri¯cation technology satisfying assumptions in Lemma
1, an interior equilibrium exists with ®, Â, and m strictly between zero and one.
17 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Corruption and Tax Evasion
In the following we provide some comparative statics for the interior equi-
librium, which is of our primary interest.
Table 2 - Comparative statics
E®ect on
Compliance Corruption Monitoring Bribe
Expected
bribe
Increase in ® Â m b bpÂ
Fine for evasion Áe + ? = ? =
Fine for bribing ÁÂ ¡ ¡ ¡ + =
Monitoring cost z ¡ + = + +
Tax Rate ¿ + + = + =
Income M ¡ ¡ = + =
We study the e®ects on the behavior of taxpayers and auditors of govern-
ment's policy against bribery and tax evasion. First, consider the e®ect of a
marginal increase in the ¯ne rate for tax evasion, Áe. By (8), for any given
amount of reported income, the increase in Áe both raises the extent of the
penalty for evasion and the amount of the bribe to be paid to the public o±cial,
if evasion is detected. Thus, an increase of Áe raises the expected cost of evasion
and leads the taxpayer to report a larger share of her income.
The reason why the e®ect of Áe on Â is ambiguous is that on the one hand, it
induces a larger bribe but also a larger reward from monitoring, with intuitive
opposite e®ects on Â. The e®ect of the increased ¯ne for evasion on equilibrium
bribe b¤ is also ambiguous due to the reduced evasion. These e®ects highlight the
competitive nature of the price of corruption and the relevance of endogenous
monitoring in our model: an increased level of compliance induced by a larger
18¯ne for evasion reduces expected bene¯ts from monitoring. To keep monitoring
at a given level, corruption and bribes have to adjust in opposite directions so
that the expected level of bribes does not change due to increased compliance
(remember that p® > 0). Which exact adjustment takes place depends on the
elasticity of the level of compliance to the ¯ne for evasion, on monitoring costs
and other underlying parameters of the economy. In particular, looking at the
equilibrium level of the bribe
b







it follows that by raising Áe the bribe will rise when the positive direct e®ect of
Áe on b¤ is stronger than the negative indirect e®ect which operates through a
reduction of the evasion 1¡®¤, that is the equilibrium bribe increases (corruption






i.e. the bribe is increasing in the ¯nes if the elasticity (absolute value) of
evasion to the ¯ne is less than one. In other words if the increase in the ¯ne for
evasion triggers a less than proportional reduction in the evasion the equilibrium
bribe is going to increase and corruption is going to increase.
In any case the ex-ante expected amount of bribery, Âbp, measuring the
aggregate value of corruptive transactions does not vary.
Consider next the e®ect of a marginal increase in the ¯ne rate for bribery,
ÁÂ. As shown before a change in ÁÂ determines direct e®ects neither on the
amount of the penalty for evasion nor on the expected cost of exploiting the
opportunity of bribery, the latter being (1 ¡ ´ + ´m)Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M. The rise
in the penalty rate ÁÂ, however, determines a reduction in the value of m¤.
Intuitively an increase in ÁÂ increases the expected cost from corruption and
m has to decrease to compensate for the reduction in corruption incentives. As
for the e®ects on corruption, a larger ÁÂ increases the expected cost of taking a
bribe, for any given b, reducing her incentive to be corrupted. Due to the ¯ne
dilution e®ect of corruption, however, the level of ¯scal compliance is reduced.
This result can be contrasted with the results obtained in Polinsky and Shavell
(2001), Mookherjee and Png (1993), Chander and Wilde (1993) where, due to
the independence of probability of detecting corruption and ¯nes, it is always
true that by increasing the ¯ne for corruption, compliance for the underlying
o®ence is improved. The results above can be summarized in the following
Proposition 3 At an interior equilibrium, an increase in the ¯nes for evasion
will reduce the aggregate level of evasion with ambiguous e®ects on corruption,
whereas an increase in the ¯ne for corruption will increase the aggregate level
of evasion and reduce corruption.
To summarize, in this section we presented a simple model where ¯scal com-
pliance, tax auditing, corruption and corruption monitoring are simultaneously
19determined. We have shown that increasing ¯nes for evasion in this model will
always induce a reduction in tax evasion whereas it has ambiguous e®ects on
corruption and bribes which may rise as a consequence. Increasing ¯nes for
corruption will reduce corruption and save costs of monitoring at the cost of
increasing evasion. Contrary to the common assumption in the literature we
have shown that competition among public o±cials, driving to no expected
rents in anti corruption activities, may have counterintuitive implications about
the relationship between ¯nes for corruption and the equilibrium level for the
underlying o®ence. It is still true, as in the classical analysis of optimal ¯nes,
that increasing ¯nes for corruption allows a reduction in the level of monitoring
activities and savings in related costs. However, this does not leave una®ected
the level of deterrence for the underlying o®ence. To further investigate the
relationship between ¯nes, corruption and incentives to tax compliance, in the
next section we analyze the optimal level of ¯nes from the point of view of a
utilitarian planner.
6 Welfare Analysis
In this section we use the results derived in previous sections to assess the nor-
mative implications of our model of tax evasion, corruption and monitoring. Let
us brie°y summarize the ¯ndings obtained so far. We studied a simple economy
composed of a population of measure 1 = n0 + n1 + n2. A fraction n0 of the
population produces income M pays ¿®M as an income tax, taking the gamble
to evade part of it. Tax revenues are collected to ¯nance the public good to
be provided in the economy. A fraction n1 is paid a ¯xed wage w, is assigned
the right to audit taxpayers and is endowed with a state veri¯cation technol-
ogy that allows the tax auditors to verify the true tax base with a probability
p(®). In the event evasion is proved the opportunity of corruption emerges, at
an equilibrium probability Â. A fraction of incorruptible n2 = n1m agents is
assigned the right to monitor the tax auditors.
In order to provide normative results we need to specify the institutional
setting of the monitoring game, the budget constraints of the monitoring au-
thority and the ¯scal budget in the aggregate and the objective function of the
planner.
In order to write the ¯scal budget and the amount of resources needed to
establish the enforcement agency we need to specify the remuneration to law
enforcers. We set the salary to the public o±cials equal to the expected income
in the economy so that all agents are ex-ante indi®erent across jobs:
w ´ Ey = (1 ¡ ®¿)M ¡ ap[(1 ¡ Â + Âm)©e + bÂ(1¡ m) + Â©Âm] (10)
Intuitively, expected income is given by net income (gross of evasion) less
expected ¯nes. The reduced form for the expected income after substituting
the equilibrium conditions for Â and m, the equilibrium value of the bribe and
assuming ´ = 1=2 we obtain the following expression for the expected income




Ey = Ey(a;¿;Áe;ÁÂ), where ¯nes, tax rates and the auditing frequency are
choice variables in the maximization problem to the social planner12.
The general ¯scal budget is then given by
n0¿®M + n1p(1¡ Â + Âm)©e + 2n1pÂ©Âm = G + B (12)
Where G is the value of the public good provided in the economy, n0¿®M
is the voluntary component of tax revenues, n1p(1 ¡ Â)©e is the total value of
the enforced ¯ne for evasion not accruing to the budget of the Tax Authority
(voluntary payment of the ¯nes by taxpayers not joining a bribing coalition)
and, ¯nally, 2n1pÂ©Âm is the value of the ¯nes for corruption obtained as an
indirect revenue raised from the monitoring activity, which we assume to be
accrued to the provision of the public good. Consistently with the idea that
¯nes motivate monitoring by the upper layer of the tax Authority we leave it
outside the general ¯scal budget constraint. B is de¯ned as gross transfers
from the general ¯scal budget to the tax authority. The Tax Authority budget
constraint is, in turn as follows
B + ©eÂmpn1 = w(1 + m)n1 + zmn1 (13)
Where B is the net transfers from the general ¯scal budget, ©eÂmpn1 is the
total revenues from collected ¯nes for evasion, w(1+m)n1 is the total (net) wage
paid to law enforcers, zmn1 is the total amount of direct costs of monitoring.
From (7) we get B = w(1 + m)n1. Therefore, from the public budget, we get
the amount of public good provided in the economy
G = [1 ¡ n1(1 + m)]M ¡ Ey ¡ n1zm (14)
The planner is modelled as an utilitarian legislator whose problem is to max-
imize total welfare. Since all agents in our economy are ex-ante indi®erent across
jobs and get utility U(®) = Ey + u(G) and having normalized our population
to one, the objective function of a utilitarian planner is given by
U(a;¿;Áe;ÁÂ) = Ey + u(G) (15)
where u(G) is such that u0(0) > 1 and u00(G) < 0. The planner maximizes
(15) with respect to the tax rate ¿ (implicitly de¯ning G), the ¯ne rates, Áe,
ÁÂ and the number of auditors n1, subject to (14) and to the limited liability
constraint
12Having assumed no commitment to the probability of detection of corruptive agreements,
we let the planner to choose the number of tax auditors n1, but not the number of agents
monitoringcorruption. The number ofagentsin charge forthe enforcementofanti-corruption
legislation, n2 is set, in equilibrium, as in the previous section. The allocation is equivalent
to letting the planner choose optimally the number of n2 and letting n1 to adjust to the
equilibrium conditions.
21©e + ©Â · (1 ¡ ®¿)M (16)




s.to G = [1¡ n1(1+ m)]M ¡ Ey ¡ n1zm
©e + ©Â · (1¡ ®¿)M
U® = 0
(17)
Before solving the problem let us analyze 16 at an interior equilibrium for




)(1¡ ®)¿ · 1 ¡ ®¿:
The solution for this program can be characterized by standard techniques.
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem can be written as follows.




By solving the Lagrangian we obtain the following
Proposition 4 At an interior equilibrium (0 < ®¤ < 1; 0 < m¤ < 1; 0 < Â¤ <
1; ¿ > 0): i. maximal ¯nes principle holds in (17) at G > 0, ii. Áe > 0 and
ÁÂ > 0.
Proof. Set ¸ = 0 in (17) and get a contradiction. See Appendix B for further
details.
The intuition is rather simple. Part i. can be explained as follows: assume
maximal ¯ne does not hold i.e. ¸ = 0. No maximal ¯nes immediately implies
no underdeterrence (G = GFB). Where GFB is given by the ¯rst best level
public good in the case of no enforcement problem, u0(GFB) = u0(¿M) = 1.
At no maximal ¯ne the planner can increase the ¯ne for corruption to save on
monitoring costs and increase ¯ne for evasion to keep the desired level of de-
terrence. Part ii. is an immediate implication of the equilibrium being interior.
The reason is that both ¯nes are necessary to deter the underlying o®ence (tax
evasion) at interior equilibrium. Intuitively, Áe = 0 would imply no income re-
ported contradicting interior equilibrium. At Áe > 0 and ÁÂ = 0 the monitoring
costs of corruption are too large. To save on costs of enforcement increasing ÁÂ
is a better instrument than Áe to increase deterrence.
Jointly considered the two parts of the proposition state that the design of
the two ¯nes, at equilibrium, has to saturate the limited liability constraint of
the o®ender (maximal ¯nes) in this model. The reason for ¯ghting corruption
through ¯nes however is not due to the usual argument that raising ¯nes for cor-
ruption increases deterrence for the underlying violation. In our model raising
¯nes for corruption reduces ¯scal compliance and monitoring costs. Di®erently
22from the classical analysis where ¯nes and the probability of detection are in-
dependent instruments in the hand of the planner and can be set at any level
for given deterrence, in our case the level of anti corruption activities replies
to incentives depending on the ¯nes. Increasing the ¯ne for corruption reduces
corruption and monitoring. The social cost of increasing ¯nes for corruption in
our model is measured by the lower ¯scal compliance induced.
We ¯nally analyze the optimal amount of public good provided in the model.
To motivate the analysis notice that increasing the tax rate ¿ will reduce cor-
ruption and increase tax compliance in our simple economy. Can it be the case
that a utilitarian planner, to motivate monitoring and foster deterrence both for
tax evasion and corruption, may decide to increase the tax rate at a level such
that more than the ¯rst best level of public good is provided? In other words
can the tax rate substitute ¯nes to provide the optimal amount of deterrence?
The answer to this question is no, as shown in the following
Proposition 5 In an economy with imperfect commitment to monitoring cor-
ruption and maximal ¯nes we get G < GFB.
Proof: see Appendix B.
The reason why it is never e±cient to upward distort the provision of the
public good by increasing ¿ in spite of its positive e®ects both on the deterrence
of the underlying o®ence and corruption is that, by increasing ¿, makes the
limited liability constraint more strict, therefore the tax rate is an ine±cient
instrument to increase deterrence compared to ¯nes.
7 Conclusions
We considered a simple economy where self interested taxpayers may have in-
centives to evade taxes and to escape sanctions by bribing public o±cials in
charge for tax collection. Public o±cials, both those involved in tax auditing
and those in charge for anticorruption activities, are rents seekers. Tax auditors
try to appropriate rents through bribes, those in charge for monitoring corrup-
tion are motivated by rewards measured by the size of the ¯nes. In this setting
we study the case where the price for corruption sets at a level where no ex ante
rents from corruption and its monitoring are anticipated, i.e. any rent in the
public sector is dissipated via monitoring costs and both bribing and monitoring
are competitive activities. We characterize the equilibrium with corruption and
bribing and study the interactions between evasion, corruption and monitor-
ing as well as their adjustment to a change in the institutional setting. In the
proposed framework, larger ¯nes for evasion will increase tax compliance with
ambiguous e®ects on corruption. Complete dissipation of rents in the public
sector implies that the bribe and the level of corruption move in opposite direc-
tions in reply to an increase in the ¯ne for evasion. A larger ¯ne for corruption
will reduce corruption at the cost of reducing tax compliance.
We also considered the optimal design of ¯nes in this setting, where the
classical dichotomy between ¯nes and probability of detection is lost. Corruption
23activities along with their ¯ne dilution e®ect interact in a non trivial way with
the amount of rents dissipated in monitoring costs. Interestingly, a maximal ¯ne
result holds in the case of a utilitarian legislator, the reason beingthat increasing
¯nes reduces monitoring costs at the cost of increasing ¯scal non compliance.
Intuitively, ¯ghting corruption through ¯nes is valuable to the planner since it
reduces the amount of rent dissipation in the public sector. The shadow value
of imperfect enforcement is de¯ned in terms of the public good provided by a
utilitarian government: in the presence of evasion and corruption: imperfect
enforcement induces a smaller level of public good to be provided compared to
the ¯rst best.
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268 Appendix A
To determine the behavior of the endogenous variables at the optimum after a
local variation in the parameters of interest, let denote
F 1 ´ aÁe
µ
1 ¡ ´Â¤ ÁÂ
1 + ÁÂ
¶
[p(®¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ®¤)p®] ¡ 1,










































evaluated at the optimum is strictly negative. Therefore, the sign of the deriva-




































evaluated at the optimum. The determinant is always strictly negative, therefore
d®¤=dÁÂ < 0. The sign of the derivative of Â¤ with respect to ÁÂ is the same


































evaluated at the optimum, which is negative, therefore dÂ¤=dÁÂ < 0


































evaluated at the optimum. The determinant is always strictly positive, therefore
d®¤=dÁe > 0. The sign of the derivative of Â¤ with respect to Áe is the same as
































evaluated at the optimum, whose sign is ambiguous.
279 Appendix B
In this section we provide the derivation of the main results on the normative
analysis.
















By taking account of the constraints c.3, c.4 and c.5 (holding as strict equal-
ities at an interior equilibrium) into the de¯nition of Ey, de¯ne the Lagrangian
for the Kuhn Tucker problem as




L¸= 1 ¡ ®¿ ¡ Áe(1+
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By studying di®erent cases we prove now the propositions in the text.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Assume ¸ = 0, Áe > 0, ÁÂ > 0, n1 > 0;¿ > 0. >From L¿ = 0, by u0(0) > 1
we get u0(GFB) ¡ 1 = 0, at GFB > 0 i.e. if the ¯scal liability constraint is
not binding, there must be no underdeterrence and ¿ is set to obtain the ¯rst
best level of G. From LÁÂ get ¡[(M + z)n1
dm
dÁÂ] > 0 from the comparative
statics results holding for dm
dÁÂ < 0. Therefore we get a contradiction: at G > 0
and G = GFB the planner would like to increase the ¯ne for corruption to
saturate the ¯scal liability constraint (maximal ¯ne). Moreover from Ln1 we get:
¡[(1+ m)M + mz) < 0, that is, provided that no underdeterrence holds at ¯rst
best the planner is willing to save on monitoring cost by reducing the number
28of auditors contradicting the hypothesis that the equilibrium is at interior ®, m
and Â.¤
Proof of Proposition 5.
Assume ¸ > 0, Áe > 0, ÁÂ > 0, n1 > 0 and G ¸ GFB in 21. Since G ¸ GFB
is assumed, it must be that ¿ > 0 and proposition 3 holds. Therefore substitute
L¸ = 0 into L¿ = 0 to get L¿ =
@ Ey




d¿ ] · 0. Since we
assumed G ¸ GFB, given the hypothesis on u0(G) and u00(G), it must be that
1 ¡ u0(G) > 0 and since
@ Ey




d¿ > 0 i.e. d®
d¿ > 1¡®
¿(1¡¿). From











yielding a contradiction. Therefore it must be G < GF B. ¤
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